The war in Sudan has plunged eastern Chad into a serious humanitarian crisis and caused tensions among the ruling authorities in N’Djamena. To preserve the country’s stability, the Chadian government should get more emergency aid to the east and restore neutrality to its Sudan policy.
The conflict that has been ravaging Sudan for more than two years is posing a growing threat to the stability of its neighbour, Chad. Since the war began, Chad’s eastern provinces that border the Sudanese region of Darfur have taken in more than a million people fleeing the violence – a number that continues to swell. Lacking sufficient funding, Chad’s humanitarian response agencies are overwhelmed and could become even more so with the end of U.S. aid. Meanwhile, the influx of people has caused living conditions in eastern Chad to deteriorate, fuelling crime and inter-ethnic distrust. At the same time, in N’Djamena, the Chadian capital, tensions are mounting around President Mahamat Déby Itno. Prominent members of his Zaghawa clan have accused him of allowing the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to use Chadian territory to supply arms to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of the two main belligerents in the Sudanese conflict. The Chadian authorities’ support for the RSF, which has been widely documented but is still denied by Abu Dhabi and N’Djamena, has also led the Sudanese army, which is fighting the RSF and claims legitimate authority in the country, to threaten them with reprisal.
To keep Chad from getting further embroiled in the Sudanese crisis, N’Djamena should step up emergency aid to the east, and pursue the region’s economic development, including by seeking financial support from the UAE. It should also explore ways to restore the neutrality that the Chadian government proclaimed at the war’s outset.
Overburdened Humanitarian Relief
In April 2023, a dispute between the Sudanese army – led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan – and the RSF – commanded by his former deputy, Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, or “Hemedti” – over merging the two forces degenerated into open warfare. Starting in the capital, Khartoum, the fighting quickly spread to other parts of the country, forcing more than thirteen million people to flee, four million of them to neighbouring countries. Nearly 1.2 million of them (around 875,000 Sudanese refugees and 300,000 Chadian returnees) went to eastern Chad, which shares more than 1,400km of border with Sudan. The majority of the refugees are from the Sudanese states of West Darfur and North Darfur; they belong to non-Arab ethnic groups that live on both sides of the border. They have mainly settled in the Chadian provinces of Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira and Ennedi East.
This massive influx of people has created an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in regions that were already facing numerous economic and social difficulties, including high poverty rates and a lack of basic services. Aid for the new arrivals has been insufficient. Disputes among them over means of sustenance are taking on worrying proportions as the crisis drags on. Meanwhile, the worsening living conditions are giving rise to xenophobia among the local population, particularly in eastern towns, where Chadians often blame the Sudanese for higher prices and increasing crime. Humanitarian workers also regularly report cases of assaults on refugees, particularly women, on the outskirts of the camps, where gender-based violence is rife. In June, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) acknowledged that the crisis had reached “a catastrophic breaking point”. The scale of the problems may be even bigger than humanitarian agencies know. They admit that, due to a lack of funding and personnel, they have only a partial view of eastern Chad’s predicament. In any case, they agree that mortality in the region is likely to increase as a result of malnutrition, disease and violence.
The freeze on U.S. aid announced in January by President Donald Trump bodes ill for the people languishing in eastern Chad. In 2025, the United States funded Chad’s humanitarian response plan, which helps refugees as well as the most vulnerable Chadians, to the tune of around $260 million, a third of its total budget and three times the amount contributed by the European Union, the second largest contributor. A large part of this aid had already been disbursed when the freeze became public in January. Humanitarian workers on the ground predict that the effects of the suspension of funding will start to be felt in August, and even more strongly in 2026, when the programs are due to expire without being renewed. “After August, it’s all a blur”, a Western donor country official said. None of Chad’s traditional partners, not even the EU, can fill the gap the U.S. cuts will leave. Donor negotiations to finance the UN’s new humanitarian response plan, whose needs for 2026 are estimated at $1.4 billion, should already be completed but are at a standstill. As of June, only 9 per cent of the plan had been funded.
Crime and Communal Tensions in Ouaddaï
At the epicentre of the crisis is the province of Ouaddaï, which has received around half the people arriving in Chad since the Sudanese conflict started. Conditions in the town of Adré, the main entry point for Sudanese refugees into Chad, show the effects of this influx. Humanitarian workers wanted to turn this border town into a transit centre from which new arrivals could be relocated to better equipped camps far from the frontier, but they were quickly stretched beyond capacity. As a result, the population of Adré has grown from around 20,000 before the war to more than 250,000 today, leading to higher prices and unemployment. Diseases linked to poor access to drinking water have also spread. Humanitarian workers now fear a cholera epidemic in the city, with more than 260 cases, having been detected in the province since July. The disease has already claimed twelve lives.
Faced with these hardships, the solidarity shown by Ouaddaï’s people at first is fading away. At the start of the crisis, the local population – many of whom share communal ties with the new arrivals – made land available to settle the refugees and helped provide them with food and water while humanitarian organisations were setting up shop. These shows of mutual aid have now all but disappeared, and some residents are now demanding compensation from humanitarian agencies or even return of the land they said the refugees could live on. According to a confidential database, in June, young Chadian men physically threatened NGOs in several villages in the province, demanding a larger share of the aid.
An increase in crime associated with the new arrivals is stoking tensions between refugees and long-time residents. In 2024, it was rare to hear a rifle shot in Adré. Now, gunfire can be heard every evening after dark. Chadian law enforcement agencies are sometimes caught off guard by the level of violence: in May, a telephone thief threw a grenade at soldiers pursuing him in the Adré camp, injuring seven of them and accidentally killing himself. “Adré is a powder keg”, said a humanitarian official who fears that his employees will be robbed, particularly by “the Colombians”, a gang whose name refers to South American cartels. Already present in West Darfur, particularly in the Ardamata camp for displaced persons, this group is growing at a worrying rate in Adré and the surrounding refugee camps, such as Metche and Ourang. Made up mainly of children who have fled or lost their family, as well as young Sudanese refugee men, mostly Massalit and other non-Arabs, this gang is involved in thefts in Chad and cross-border trafficking of drugs (particularly tramadol, a powerful opioid, and cannabis). They also regularly attack passersby whom they suspect of being Arabs.
These incidents point to the alarming growth of inter-communal rancour, particularly (but not exclusively) between Arabs and non-Arabs, in eastern Chad. Sudanese refugees, most of whom are Massalit, fled atrocities committed by the RSF, whose ranks are comprised mostly of Arabs, and many of them want revenge. These tensions come on top of pre-existing ethnic cleavages in the region. According to several sources, self-defence groups have been forming since mid-2023 in villages across eastern Chad, each claiming to be protecting its community from crime or conflict linked to the scarcity of land and water. One of these groups, called Defence, Intelligence and Support, is made up mainly of Zaghawa – the ethnic minority from which Chad’s rulers have come since the 1990s – from the provinces of Wadi Fira and Ouaddaï. In June, some of its members clashed with residents of another community in Arounga, a village in Ouaddaï, over a dispute linked to the theft of a motorbike. Seventeen people were killed as a result.
Pressure Rises in Wadi Fira and Ennedi Est
As the RSF intensifies its operations in Darfur after losing Khartoum in March, the problems in Ouaddaï are likely to spread to other border provinces hitherto less affected by the humanitarian crisis.
Since April, the provinces of Wadi Fira and Ennedi Est, to the north of Ouaddaï, have received a wave of more than 100,000 Sudanese. These new refugees, mostly women and children, are part of the 500,000 people who fled the Zamzam camp for displaced persons, located around 15km from El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. This town, held by the Sudanese army and allied militias, has been encircled by the RSF since May. As part of a major offensive to take control of El Fasher, the RSF looted and set fire to Zamzam in April, virtually wiping it off the map and killing at least 1,500 people, according to a provisional estimate. Most of the camp’s inhabitants remained in Sudan, settling precariously in Tawila, a town around 200km from the Chadian border. But water supply and sanitation there are woefully inadequate, and food distribution by the World Food Programme will be reduced from August onward due to lack of funds. These conditions could lead even more Sudanese to seek refuge in Chad, particularly in Wadi Fira and Ennedi Est, which are close to Tawila.
The border town of Tiné, in Wadi Fira, is already coming under increasing pressure. A major crossing point into North Darfur, this locality has been a transit centre for humanitarian workers since the war began. Refugees arriving here are usually relocated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to new reception facilities farther away from the border, equipped with functional shelters and a food distribution system. But the influx of refugees since April has overwhelmed the UNHCR’s transport capacity. At the end of August, more than 15,000 refugees from Zamzam were still living on a plot of wasteland on Tiné’s outskirts, sleeping on the ground and shading themselves with a huge patchwork of loincloths hung on wooden poles. These refugees are surviving on the generosity of Tiné residents, who regularly bring them food and water. Some locals have even welcomed refugee families into their homes, thanks partly to ethnic ties (the new arrivals are mostly Zaghawa, as are many long-time residents).As in Ouaddaï, however, such solidarity could dissipate if the crisis brings greater hardship to Wadi Fira.
Faced with rising insecurity and deteriorating living conditions in the east, the Chadian authorities have taken a number of measures. They have stepped up military patrols and introduced local curfews, including in Adré. At the end of June, after the clashes in Arounga, a government team visited the area, helping the two warring parties reconcile. Together with the World Bank, N’Djamena has also launched programs to lower the high cost of living in the region, and in June it announced a new National Development Plan, which should include investment in the eastern provinces, particularly in infrastructure and agriculture. But these responses are not enough to meet the sheer scale of need. If more is not done, there is a major risk that access to humanitarian relief will be restricted due to increasing insecurity, adding to the human cost of the crisis. Escalating tensions could also make the region more difficult to govern and even more isolated, leading the central authorities to prioritise security over development.
High Tensions in N’Djamena
The Sudan conflict’s shock waves are felt not only in eastern Chad but also as far away as N’Djamena, where the ruling clan is riven with disputes over the government’s involvement in the crisis next door. These tensions could be disruptive in one of the few states in this troubled region to maintain a degree of stability.
The Chadian government maintains close relations with Abu Dhabi, which several parties to the conflict accuse of being the RSF’s main sponsor, supplying the paramilitaries with arms via Chadian territory. Chad and the UAE have systematically denied these allegations, though they are backed up by several UN reports, press articles, photos and videos, satellite images and other open sources. Many diplomats have told Crisis Group that the allegations are accurate. That said, arms deliveries from Chad seem to have declined since the development of alternative routes, notably via southern Libya, over the course of 2025.
In the short term, collaboration with the UAE is to President Mahamat Déby’s advantage. Déby, who took power after the death of his father, Idriss Déby Itno, in 2021, is using Emirati funding (which includes two loans totalling $2 billion, signed in 2023 and 2024) to underwrite a policy of patronage aimed at quelling power struggles among the Zaghawa, to whom his father belonged. These funds also enable him to cement new allegiances, particularly among the Goran community, to which his mother belongs, thereby broadening his support base and strengthening his hold on power.
Over the longer term, however, this pact could weaken him. Certain parts of the Zaghawa community in Chad are convinced of the existence of Chadian-Emirati support for the RSF, and are angry that the Sudanese paramilitaries regularly target non-Arabs, including Zaghawa, in Darfur. Traditional chiefs and senior Chadian army officers of Zaghawa origin have been highly critical of the use of Chadian territory for arms deliveries to the RSF. Their sense of grievance has heightened following the RSF offensive in North Darfur, particularly the siege of El Fasher – a Zaghawa stronghold whose residents have family ties in Chad – and the assault on the Zamzam camp in April.
Since 2023, according to sources close to the government, these tensions have stirred fears of instability at the heart of power. They are said to have prompted several changes in security arrangements for the president and at institutions including the army and the Ministry of Public Security. Rough estimates gathered by Crisis Group from combatants in Darfur indicate that several hundred Chadian soldiers have deserted since 2023 and gone to fight the RSF, joining Zaghawa militias allied with the Sudanese army. Small politico-military groups with a Zaghawa majority opposed to Déby have followed the same path. Among them is the group led by Ousmane Dillo, the president’s cousin and brother of the late opposition figure Yaya Dillo (who was killed in a clash with state forces in February 2024, on the eve of the last presidential election).
The UAE’s policy in Chad has also precipitated a diplomatic crisis between the Chadian government and the Sudanese army, which claims to be the sole legitimate authority in the country. Chad and Sudan expelled each other’s diplomats in December 2023. Tensions came to a head in March, when the Sudanese army’s deputy chief of staff publicly threatened to bomb the airports of N’Djamena and Amdjarass (capital of the Ennedi Est region, where President Déby’s family originates), through which Emirati arms are said to transit. It is unlikely that the Sudanese army wants to enter open conflict with Chad, but it could decide to support Chadian dissidents, in particular Ousmane Dillo, as well as Chadian officers opposed to Déby. Chad and Sudan have previously engaged in proxy clashes, most recently in the 2000s.
Aware of these risks, President Déby has taken precautionary measures. On one hand, he has stepped up surveillance inside the army to curb desertion and sought to neutralise politico-military groups likely to threaten his power. The Chadian army has carried out drone bombardments of Chadian rebels in Darfur, while offering other militiamen the chance to rejoin the army. A few dozen have accepted, laying down their arms at the Bahai border post in the Ennedi Est region in May.
On the other hand, Déby has tried to appease the Sudanese army by resuming dialogue with General al-Burhan. Saudi Arabia, which has sought (so far unsuccessfully) to play a mediating role in the Sudanese crisis, while also providing the army with political support and aid for the future reconstruction of the country, has supported this attempt at rapprochement. In March, a Saudi delegation travelled to Amdjarass and then organised a meeting between Chadian and Sudanese officers in Port Sudan, on the Red Sea coast, where the Sudanese army has had its headquarters since shortly after the war began. The main goal was to persuade Chad to adopt a neutral stance in the conflict by putting an end to the alleged arms deliveries from its territory. But N’Djamena showed no sign of budging: shortly after these meetings, Déby paid a visit to Abu Dhabi, where he announced that the two countries would strengthen their partnership.
Saving the Humanitarian Response and Galvanising Diplomacy
Shielding Chad from the effects of the war in Sudan remains a priority. As Crisis Group recommended in November 2024, the Chadian government should bolster efforts to mitigate the socio-economic crisis in the east, while official visits to the region should reinforce messages aimed at dampening communal tensions. In order to prevent young men from being recruited into militias or criminal groups, N’Djamena should boost initiatives to combat the high cost of living (by distributing cash or food to vulnerable households) and invest in the region, particularly in labour-intensive projects.
Chad’s political stability now appears to hinge on its partnership with the UAE. Emirati financial support provides President Déby with the capital and investment he needs to consolidate his power, while Abu Dhabi has made N’Djamena a strategic ally as it pursues its growing geopolitical and economic ambitions in Africa. While the two countries have no interest in abandoning their partnership, they could nevertheless consider adjusting some of their policies to prevent all or part of Chad from sliding into insecurity.
On one hand, Abu Dhabi could become involved in emergency aid and economic development in Chad to ease tensions in the east of the country. In particular, it could help make up for the funding shortfall caused by the U.S. aid freeze by supporting Chad’s humanitarian relief operation, as it has already done in Sudan. The UAE could also provide financial support for the National Development Plan that aims to combat unemployment and stimulate the economy in eastern Chad. This plan, already bankrolled by the International Monetary Fund to the tune of $630 million, is the focus of a donor conference that Abu Dhabi is hosting this September. The UAE has already shown an interest in investing in Chad: in May, it announced funding, the amount of which has not yet been disclosed, for constructing a hospital and a gigantic mosque in N’Djamena, as well as a railway linking the capital to Cameroon.
On the other hand, Déby should consider rebalancing his policy toward Sudan so that N’Djamena once again stands neutral in the conflict between the Sudanese army and the RSF. If it is indeed the case that the UAE is delivering weapons to the RSF through Chad, as the evidence suggests, Déby could point to Chad’s acute exposure to reprisal from Sudan as grounds to ask the UAE to suspend the supply of arms. For its part, Abu Dhabi could come to the conclusion that further destabilisation of Déby’s presidency, Chad itself and the region would not serve Emirati interests. The Chadian authorities should also pursue contacts with allies of the Sudanese army, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to help bring about a thaw in relations with Burhan, bearing in mind that no working diplomatic relations will be possible so long as many in Sudan perceive Chad as a logistical base for the RSF.